I have just retired from the ICBM systems engineering field, after over 53 years of being extensively involved with the Air Force Nuclear Safety community. This involvement allowed me the opportunity to become rated as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the expanding field of risk assessment. Having been intimately involved in the evolution of the field, I helped in writing several of the Air Force Nuclear Surety (safety + security) Instructions, as well as being fortunate to take time along the way to consult with other DoD, DOE and commercial customers in the fields of nuclear command and control, nuclear surety, cryptologic device certification, information systems security, and risk assessment.
One of the reasons I'm recognized as a SME in the systems risk analysis process, is that I'm the only individual in the county to work with all three services in a specialized, classified risk assessment area. I’ve written or co-written numerous nuclear surety risk assessments for all three services, and had the opportunity of learning the differences in perspectives on the subject each organization brings to the table. It all started accelerating when the Titan ICBM blew up in 1980 near Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Being one of a two-man Minuteman nuclear safety office at Hill AFB, I was involved in remediation efforts after the incident to enhance Titan nuclear surety and briefed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy on what the Air Force was doing in that area. Next thing I knew, I was contracted to help General Dynamics conduct a risk assessment on the Ground Launched Cruise Missile they were building, requiring interacting with the Navy Tomahawk Nuclear Cruise Missile and the Submarine Nuclear Safety offices. By the end of the decade, I had also conducted risk assessments on the Peacekeeper ICBM for the Air Force and been contracted with the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency as the risk assessment SME on review teams for the Pershing I and II, and Lance tactical missiles. That was followed with evaluating Army nuclear weapon storage sites in Germany and the continental US. All these experiences culminated in the early 90s with being able to lead some talented folks in the development of a risk database the Air Force now uses to quantify nuclear surety risks. This database was designed to incorporate the results of several Independent Research and Development (IR&D) projects in the late-1980s/early-1990s on which I was principal investigator. The early 90s also had me leading a TRW team that conducted an NSA-funded assessment of nuclear safety issues surrounding allowing Russian START inspectors in Minuteman launch facilities, and B-1B and B-52 bombers, co-writing both reports. And yes, I wasn’t home very much.
Other risk assessment–related assignments over the years include: 1) supporting a TRW project supporting Tank Waste Remediation Systems efforts at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, working with Westinghouse engineers in designing a risk assessment on the process of characterizing some awful waste and safely disposing of it. 2) Leading a team in the investigation of a computer module for the TRW Automotive Group that controlled the operation of several safety and security related functions on Ford and Nissan automotive platforms. Using the fault-tree process developed by the ICBM program, probable causation paths were determined and eventually the problem was isolated and resolved with a programming change. My ICBM experience with integrating numerous independent contractor built subsystems modules into an overall system (i.e., systems engineering), came in handy. The key issue is defining the interfaces that each module faces and integrating them properly, i.e., systems engineering. 3) The automotive effort evolved into a program to verify and validate software/firmware for several modules, which I formed and led a team in conducting. 4) Work with NSA to obtain their Type I cryptographic device certification for military cryptographic devices and with NSA/US Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command on integrating a cryptographic device into an NC2 communications network.
Failing attempts at phasing down and retiring, in 2006 I started Ronald Gault Consulting LLC (RGC), and have since split my time between supporting commercial customers in the areas of IT security and risk assessment and the ICBM program. RGC clients have included Luther-Midelfort Mayo Heath Services, numerous schools in the Northwestern University organization, Cayman Islands Health Services Agency, and Ecolab Inc. I've provided information systems risk assessment and risk management support to these clients and have helped organize information security programs, write corporate security policies, conduct Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance audits, and develop information security risk remediation solutions. Recently I have supported Air Force efforts in supply chain risk and cyber security in addition to continuing risk assessment support to the ICBM program. My current assignment has been conducting a review of the ICBM nuclear certification progress on the developing new ICBM (named Sentinel), via a consulting agreement with the Aerospace Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center.
I’ve had a turn at being an author. Originally commissioned by the National Security Agency in 1982, I wrote and since completed several updates over the years to a classified book on the history of the Air Force ICBM nuclear command and control systems. The book covers all three versions of the Minuteman and the now-retired Peacekeeper missile. I conducted NC2 training programs for NSA based around his book and was involved in training the next generation of engineers in the NC2 community, something I really enjoyed.
One thing being involved with all these investigative teams and writing efforts over the years has taught me is that one person can't do it all or SEE it all. It takes different perspectives to DEFINE the overall picture in a societal way, especially when analyzing events that must deal with the likelihood of an adversary attempting to perpetuate an unwanted action. Many of our mitigators in society depend on deterring attackers from not attempting an action by threat of harm or retaliation, something that is not readily modeled by statistical analysis tools (i.e., mitigative benefit of penalty devices). So there's still room for the human brain in this analytic process! With the forming of Team RGC, I've brought in handpicked additional skill sets to RGC that allows an even broader depth and range of risk assessment analytic capabilities.